Database access management
for EU-regulated teams
Teleport, StrongDM, and HashiCorp Boundary all solve network-level access control. For EU teams under GDPR, NIS2, or DORA, that is not enough. Field-level permissions, GDPR-ready audit trails, and CLOUD Act-safe infrastructure require a different category of tool.
Below is a direct comparison of how Scalple differs from the alternatives your procurement team will evaluate.
Feature comparison
Evaluated against the requirements of GDPR Article 32, NIS2 Article 21, and data sovereignty under EU law.
| Capability | Scalple | Teleport | StrongDM | Boundary | SSH |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU-only infrastructure (no CLOUD Act risk) | |||||
| Field-level access control (not just connection-level) | |||||
| INSERT-only tamper-evident audit trail | |||||
| GDPR DSR (Data Subject Request) workflows | |||||
| RoPA generation (GDPR Art. 30) | |||||
| Zero credential exposure | Partial | Partial | |||
| Sandboxed query execution (V8 Isolates) | |||||
| Self-hosted on EU infrastructure | N/A | ||||
| No US parent company (CLOUD Act safe) | N/A | ||||
| GDPR Art. 28 DPA as standard |
Comparisons based on publicly available documentation as of May 2026. Product capabilities may have changed. Contact us to flag inaccuracies.
Why EU teams need a CLOUD Act-safe alternative
The US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act, 2018) allows US law enforcement to compel US-headquartered companies to provide access to data they control — regardless of where that data is physically stored.
This means: if your database access management vendor is incorporated in the US, your audit logs, session metadata, and connection records are accessible to US authorities under CLOUD Act orders — even if the software runs on servers in Frankfurt.
For EU healthtech and fintech companies processing sensitive personal data, this creates a compliance gap that contract terms cannot close.
Teleport
Gravitational Inc. — Austin, TX, USA
CLOUD Act applies to audit logs and metadata
StrongDM
StrongDM Inc. — San Jose, CA, USA
CLOUD Act + AWS infrastructure
HashiCorp Boundary
HashiCorp (IBM) — San Francisco, CA, USA
CLOUD Act applies to all data controlled
Scalple
RedDotIndustries SRL — Romania, EU
No CLOUD Act exposure. No US sub-processors.
Detailed comparison
Scalple vs pg_audit
Logs the database role, not the personpg_audit records which PostgreSQL role executed a query — not which human. In a shared-credential environment (readonly_user, app_user), this tells an auditor nothing: you cannot attribute a query to a named identity, a session purpose, or a business justification.
GDPR Article 32 requires audit trails that are attributable to natural persons. pg_audit cannot satisfy this requirement without additional identity infrastructure that most teams do not build.
pg_audit has no field-level access control. Every user with the database role can read every column the role can access — there is no mechanism to mask IBAN, SSN, or health record fields per individual.
pg_audit logs are stored in the PostgreSQL server's log files, which can be rotated, deleted, or modified by database administrators. There is no cryptographic chain to detect log tampering. For GDPR Article 32 compliance evidence, an INSERT-only schema with cryptographic chaining is the required standard.
Scalple vs Teleport
Network access only — no GDPR compliance storyTeleport operates at the network layer: it controls who can establish a database connection. It does not control which tables or fields a user can access after connecting.
Audit logs in Teleport record connection events, not query-level operations. A DPA investigating a GDPR breach needs field-level access records — Teleport cannot provide these.
Teleport cloud-hosted deployments are operated by Gravitational Inc. (US), creating CLOUD Act exposure. Self-hosted Teleport deployments present a different risk profile — the CLOUD Act concern primarily applies where Gravitational has data access, which self-hosted deployments may avoid. However, Gravitational's US domicile means any data or metadata that transits Gravitational infrastructure — including telemetry and licensing checks — may be subject to US legal process.
No DSR workflow, no RoPA generation, no breach notification tooling. Compliance features are absent from the product architecture.
Scalple vs StrongDM
US company, AWS-native, no EU data sovereigntyStrongDM is a US-headquartered SaaS product. Its infrastructure runs on AWS, which is subject to the US CLOUD Act regardless of the AWS region selected.
Like Teleport, StrongDM operates at the connection level. Field-level access control — critical for GDPR Article 32 data minimisation — is outside its scope.
There is no INSERT-only audit trail. StrongDM's logs can be modified by administrators, making them insufficient for tamper-evident GDPR compliance evidence. (Based on publicly documented product architecture as of May 2026.)
For EU companies processing health data, financial records, or any personal data under GDPR, StrongDM's US ownership creates a structural compliance gap that cannot be patched by contractual measures alone.
Scalple vs HashiCorp Boundary
Infrastructure access, not database complianceBoundary is an infrastructure access tool, not a database access management platform. It manages which users can reach which hosts — not which queries they can execute.
No query-level audit logging. No field-level permissions. No GDPR compliance features. Boundary was not designed for the GDPR Article 32 use case.
HashiCorp (now IBM) is a US company. The CLOUD Act applies to data accessible to US corporations regardless of where the infrastructure is physically located.
Boundary is excellent for infrastructure access control. It is not an alternative to a database-level compliance platform.
Common questions about database access alternatives
Why is pg_audit not sufficient for GDPR Article 32 compliance?
pg_audit records the PostgreSQL role that executed a query, not the human identity. In shared-credential environments — which most engineering teams operate — pg_audit produces logs that say 'readonly_user ran SELECT * FROM users' with no information about which engineer, at what time, for what purpose, or what was returned. GDPR Article 32 requires attributable, tamper-evident audit logs. Satisfying this requirement with pg_audit alone requires significant additional identity plumbing that most teams do not maintain. Scalple structures this at the product level: every query is attributed to a named identity, scoped to specific fields, and logged in an INSERT-only cryptographically chained audit trail.
Why is Teleport not suitable for GDPR-compliant database access?
Teleport controls network-level access — who can connect — but not query-level access — what they can query, which fields they can read, or what they can modify. GDPR Article 32 requires data minimisation at the field level and tamper-evident audit logs of every operation. Teleport's audit logs record sessions, not individual queries, and Gravitational Inc.'s US domicile creates CLOUD Act exposure even for self-hosted deployments.
Why is StrongDM not suitable for EU-regulated companies?
StrongDM is a US company with AWS-based infrastructure. The US CLOUD Act allows US authorities to compel disclosure of data held by US companies regardless of where servers are located — including in AWS EU regions. Additionally, StrongDM does not enforce field-level permissions or provide INSERT-only tamper-evident audit trails required for GDPR Article 32 compliance.
What is the CLOUD Act and why does it matter for database access tools?
The US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act allows US law enforcement to compel US-based companies to provide access to data they control, regardless of where that data is physically stored. This means that if your database access management vendor is a US company — even if deployed self-hosted in the EU — the CLOUD Act potentially gives US authorities access to your audit logs and connection metadata. Scalple is based in Romania with no US sub-processors, eliminating this risk.
What is the difference between connection-level and field-level database access control?
Connection-level access control (Teleport, StrongDM, Boundary, SSH tunnels) determines who can establish a connection to a database. Once connected, the user can execute any query the database user account permits. Field-level access control (Scalple) determines which tables, columns, and rows each individual human can access in each session, regardless of the underlying database user account. For GDPR compliance, field-level control is required to enforce data minimisation and generate meaningful audit trails.
Can I migrate from SSH tunnels to Scalple without disrupting engineering workflows?
Yes. Scalple provides a browser-based query interface that replaces the need for SSH tunnel configuration. Engineers request access to specific databases for specific purposes, execute queries in a sandboxed TypeScript environment, and the session ends automatically. No client-side configuration, no credential management, no tunnel maintenance. Most teams report that engineers prefer Scalple's interface to managing SSH tunnels.
See why EU teams switch to Scalple
Book a 30-minute comparison walkthrough. We will show you exactly how Scalple differs from your current tool on the dimensions that matter for your next GDPR or NIS2 audit.